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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the school year of 1918-1919 the people of Kansas were hit 
with a severe epidemic of influenza. This caused an i nt ermittent 
operation of schools over the ent ire state . Such operation brought 
about the question of what legally constituted a school year over 
which teachers were under contract t o t each. 
A few years l ater, t he experiences of t he wri t er were , as a 
teacher, with t he corporate powers grant ed a rural high school and 
a county high school. At another t ime, t he writer taught in a 
school in wbich two teachers met the same cl .sses .for a period of 
two weeks, each contending t hat he had a contract for the position 
as teacher. 
Following the writing upon t he statut es of the state, that 
law wbich is popularly known as t he "Cash Basis Law", many schools 
had to issue bonds to meet the demand upon them. Later , some of 
t~wm re-financed t his bond issue. 
It seems, to t he writer, that it has alw~s happened, that 
when he became properly qualif i ed and certified for a good teaching 
or administrative position, t hat the school law was changed and he 
therefore found it necessary to further prepare himself . 
... 
These experiences, with others, drew the interest of the 
writer to school laws. It is said that law is a rule of action. 
As long as our schools are active, laws will be needed. As long 
as our schools are democratic organizations, functioning for a 
dynamic society, tb.e laws necessary for their operation will be-
come more complex. 
Modern industrial society has so multiplied the number of 
social contacts and has so augmented the character of social change, 
that it is absolutely necessary that new laws be spread upon the 
statutes, and among them are pound to be those effecting the 
operation of our schools. 
However, the laws of society have been embodied within its 
activities for such a long time that they ceae to be foremost in 
the thoughts of society, and are never called to the front until 
someone is damaged. By this reason, some of tb:.ese laws have never 
come before the courts for interpretation, and in this number are 
many of those relating to the organization of schools. 
The constitution of the state has arranged a system of courts 
so that the damaged person mey appeal to them for interpretation of 
the law, demanding redress. It is the policy of our state to allow 
the suitor, if defeated, to appeal his case to a higher court, if he 
feels himself aggrieved. The court may have been influenced by 
passion or prejudice, or it may have erred in its construction of the 
law. In either case, it is desirable that there be a higher tribunal, 
composed of judges of great learning and upright character, wb.ich 
may be appealed to, to correct such miscarriage of justice. 
It is from the decisions of these learned judges of the supreme 
court of the State, affecting the organization of the schools, that 
this thesis is prepared. A specific law, or a popular interpretation 
of a school law Will be given, affecting the organization of schools. 
The question involved will be mentioned and the opinion of the court 
given. 
Previous studies related to the problem of the thesis are: 
"Some Phases of Kansas School Law as Determined by Supreme Court 
Decisionsu, by Roy Hoflund, Kansas University, 1934; "Some Phases of 
School Law as Determined by Supreme Court ' s Decisions", by Rolland 
R. Elliott, Kansas University, 1935; "Some Phases of Kansas School 
Laws as Interpreted by the State Supreme Court", by John F. Lindquist, 
Kan-sas University, 1935; "A Study of Educational Trends Affecting 
School Development in Kansas from the Beginning of Statehood to the 
Present Time", by Lawrence Sayler, Fort Hays Kansas State College, 
1937; and "Supreme Court Decisions in Kansas Affecting the status of 
Employed Teachers", by Leo J. Rogers , Fort Hays Kansas state College, 
1938. 
The problem is to review supreme court decisions in Kansas 
affecting the organization of schools. 
CHAPTER II 
PLAlmING OF mE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
It is thought to be perfectly proper that a school distri ct be 
considered as only a quasi-corporation and therefore necessarily 
gover ned by legislative ~easures creating it, (Section 10-101 , 
General Statutes of 1935). 
In the case of s. E. Beach, et al ., vs. Thomas Leahy , as 
Treasurer, etc., an injunction i s br ought by Beach and six others, 
residents, electors and tax p~ers in t he School Distr i ct No . 2, 
Neosho County, to restrain Leahy, a s county treasurer , from collecting 
certain taxes levied on proper t y of t he plai tiffs . 
The records show that the board of the district had issued bonds 
on t he district of t he amount of , 15,eoo tor the purpose of erecting 
a school house in the di strict; that the bonds were issued in 
accordance with law (Chapter 35 of the laws of 1871); that to pay 
the interest on t hese bonds t he school board had levied a tax on the 
property of the tax pa&1ers of th e school district , vvb.ich was duly 
certified to the county clerk and dul y entered upon t he assessment 
rolls, and that the assessment r olls were in the hands of the defendant 
Leahy, as county treasurer. Plaintiff.a .claimed -and averred that said 
chapter 35 was a special act and unconstitutional, and said bonds were 
void. Defendant Leahy demu.rred. The district court of A:Pril Term 1872, 
sustained the demu.rrer and gave judgment in favor of tne defendants for 
costs. The plaintiffs brought the case into the supreme court by 
petition in error. 
The following opinion of the court was delivered by Brewer , J.: 
"School districts are corporations . They are created under 
general laws. The power to vote bonds to erect school houses, 
the manner in which such power shall be exercised and the amount 
of the bonds that may be issued, are prescribed and clearly 
defined and regulated by general laws and any act of the legis-
lature that attempts to confer upon a school district authority 
to issue bonds for a larger amount than other districts similarly 
situated, or seeks to release it from compliance wi th any of the 
provisions of law in issuing bonds, that mu.st be complied with 
by other districts to render their bonds valid is a special act 
conferring corporate powers, is in direct conflict with the 
constitutional provis ions above referred to and is void. 11 (1) 
In his remarks upon the case, Judge Brewer stated: 
"They are denominated in the books and known to the law as 
quasi-corporations, rather than as corporations proper. They 
possess some corporate functions, but they are primarily political 
subdivisions -- agencies in administration of civil government -
and their corporate functions are granted to enable them to more 
readily perform t heir publ ic duties .it' (2) 
In t he case of Louie J. Voss, et al., vs. the Union School 
District No. 11 et al., the plaintiffs alleged that they were citizens 
and ta.xpeyers in t he county of Crawford and holder s of real and 
personal property subject to taxation in School District No. 71, and 
were chargeable with and liable to pay school taxes against them, but 
1. Kansas Reports. Vol. 11, p. 23. 
2. Ibid. 
they alleged that certain taxes assessed and levied as school district 
taxes on their property as being in Union School District No. 11 
were illegal and void. The district court found in favor of the 
defendants and gave judgment against the plaintiffs for costs. The 
plaintiffs took the case to ' the supreme court on error. 
The following opinion of the court was delivered by Valentine, 
"The only ground upon which the plaintiffs claim that said 
taxes are inval .id is, that said school district never had a 
valid organization. · The court below, however, found that it 
had a legal and valid organization; and if that finding were 
really material in this case , still we think that this ~curt 
could not under the evidence set it aside. That the school 
district had an organization, there can be no doubt and it 
devolJed ~pon the plaintiffs to show that it never had such 
organization------- They cannot attack the legality of the 
organization of the district in the collateral mawier in which 
they have attempted to attack in this case. The organizations 
of corporations or of quas,i-corporations can only be set aside 
by a direct proceedings." (3) 
In the case of School District No. 37 of Rice County vs. The 
Board of Education of the City of Lyons, School District 69, Judge 
Porter, J., dissenting: 
"School districts possess no vested ri ght as against the 
state. There is no vested right in the existence of a quasi-
corporation such as a school district. Its rights and franchises, 
having been granted for the purposes of government, never 
become such vested rights as against the state that they cannot 
be taken awa:y. The legislature has t he authority to amend their 
charters, enlarge or diminish their powers, extend or limit 
their boundaries, consolidate two or more Ullder one, overrule 
trreir legislative action whenever it is deemed unwise, impolitic 
or unjust, and may abolish them al together." (4) 
3. Kansas Reports. 
4. Kansas Reports. 
Vol. 18, P• 467. 
Vol. 11, P• 23. 
u 
A school district is a quasi-corporation and therefore has no 
vested corporate rights as against the state. (Ch. 10, P. 101, 
General Statutes of 1935.) 
In the case of School District No. 37 of Rice County vs. The 
Board of Education of the City ·of Lyons, being School District No. 
69, the purpose of which was to defeat the consolidation of the 
two districts, a part of the syllabus of the trial court was that, 
"there is no vested right in the existence of a quasi-municipal 
colj?oration such as a school district . Its rights and fran-
chises having been granted for the purpose of government can 
never become such vested rights as against the state that 
cannot be taken away. The legislature has authority to amend 
their charters, enlarge or diminish their powers, extend or 
limit their boundaries, consolidate two or more Ulld.er one, 
over-rule their legislative action whenever it is deemed wise, 
impolitic or unjust, and may abolish them altogether." (5) 
The opinion of the court as delivere by Porter, J.: 
"There is no vested right in the existence of a municipal 
organization. To put it in another way, the existence of a 
municipal oorporation is not a vested right. A school district 
is a mere quasi-municipal corporation and municipal corpora.-
tions generally are mere agencies of the government and except 
as specially restrained by other constitutional restrictions, 
are within the continued exclusive control of legislature." ( 6) 
The notice of election petitioning for a school must be posted 
and must define the territory to be included in the school district. 
(Ch. 72, p. 3502,. General Statutes of 1935.) In the case of J. N. 
Schur et al., vs. Rural High School District No. 1 of Ottawa County, 
5. Kansas Reports. 
6. Kansas Reports. 
Vol. 110, P• 613. 
Vol. 110, P• 613. 
in which resident taxpayers of the county brought action challenging 
the validity of the organization, the syllabus of the trial court 
in. the case embodied the statement that, 
"---it is essential that the publication notice of the election 
shall define the territory to be created into such a ru.ral 
high school---" (7) 
The following opinion of the court, delivered by Dawson, J. , 
"This court is constrained to hold that the notice of the 
election required should define the territory which is 
proposed to organize." (8) 
It is understood by the majority of people, that in order 
to organize a school district, it is necessary that notices of 
same be posted previous to the meeting concerning the organization. 
In some particular instances this is not at all necessary. It may 
be that some previous action has been execu ed that lays this 
procedure aside. Or it may be that some particular law may be 
involved in which the organization of a school district without 
written notice may be possible. 
In the case of the State of Kansas, ex rel. Charles B. Griffith, 
Attorney-General, vs. Ralph A• Cannon et al .~ an action contesting 
the legality of four districts was presented to the supreme court. 
In this case it was shown that previously several districts had 
consolidated with School District No. 100, f orming a School District 
7. Kansas Reports. 
a. Kansas Reports. 
Vol. 112, P• 421. 
Vol. 112, P• 421. (~) 
No. 6. This organization turned out to be ineffective and its 
officers were unable to operate, because the people refused to vote 
bonds to construct school buildings, and at regularly called meetings 
refused to make a levy for schoo~ purposes. Later on, the county 
superintendent was called upon to re-organize a part of the district 
for school purposes. The county superintendent did this for a 
part of the district, making a public notice of the fact to all con- · 
cerned, mentioning that such would be effective, if no appeals were 
taken. Appeal was taken and the issue presented to the county 
commissioners for their consideration. The commissioners entertained 
the appeal and affirmed t he actions of the superintendent . The case 
was then taken to the supreme court contesting the acts of the 
county superintendent, the commissioners, and the thought that such 
could be done without written notice of sam 
The decision of the court made by Johnston, c. J., presents 
the fo.llowinga 
"While t he written notice as required, was not given, there was 
no lack of actual notice, as t he proposed action was sharply 
contested by the contending parties, am when the decisions of 
the county superintendent were made, those opposed promptly 
took appeal to the board of county ·commissioners. In the 
tribunal, the contending parties appeared and the matter of the 
organization was thrashed out. When the parties appealed from 
the decision of the county superintendent, they vested the board 
of county commissioners with jurisdiction of the issues involved 
and thereby the defect or omission of the written notice by the 
county superintendent was cured." (9) 
9. Xansas Reports. Vol. 116, P• 325. 
The idea of petitioning is, in a number of cases, looked upon 
in an incorrect light and misconstrued. It is thought that the 
petitioners do the organizing aDd that the legislative measures of 
the organization are through them. This is not so. The statute con-
cerning the creation of districts on petition and vote of electors 
is no grant of legislative powers. 
In the case of the State of Kansas ex rel. Herbert R. Ramsey 
as County Attorney of Reno County vs. J. J. Lamont et al., the state 
sought to enjoin the collection of taxes levied for the rural high 
school located at Tu.ron, Kansas, which had been organized under 
chapter 284 of the Laws of 1917, and to disorganize such rural 
school district. It was alleged that a petition to disorganize had 
been presented to the school board am. that they had refused. The 
principal ground of the attack was the alleged invalidation of the 
chapter 284. The court held this act valid and in the opinion of the 
court as given by West, J.-, t he following statements are gathered: 
''It i .s contended that t b.e electors of a certain territory are 
given authority to form a rural high school district and t hat 
the act is void because it delegates legislative power. The 
legislature has for many years, made provisions for t he formation 
of various high school districts upon petition of the electors 
of a given territory . It be said, by t hese enactments, to 
furnish legislation by which such electors, instead of being 
compelled, are given t he choice, to assume the burden of such 
high school concerns. Whatever mey be the proper definition 
of legislative power, the granting, rather than the exercis i ng, 
of authority for certain persons to form themselves into a 
sehool district, would seem to be within its meaning. The 
operation of the law does not depend upon the ' will of the 
petitioners, but it is the will of the legislature which is 
being put in force when the board of county commissioners find 
if J/ r-.,,o 
that the prescribed condition exists within the district whicfv 
the petitioners ask to have incorporated." (10) 
The contention in the above case next brings forth the question; 
Does the county superintendent of schools have the power and authority 
to organize a new school district? The law states that it shall be 
the duty of the county superintendent of public instruction to divide 
the county into convenient number of school districts, and to change 
such districts when the interests of the inhabitants thereof require 
it, but only after twenty days notice thereof, by written notices 
posted in at least five public places in the district to be changed. 
(Ch. 72, Art. 213 .) 
In the case of the State of Kansas, ex rel. D. E. McCrory as 
County Attorney of Pratt County vs. Fing Waters et al . as the School 
Board of District No. 91, the County A.ttorney attempts to compell 
the defendants to show by what authority they exercise the powers of 
director, clerk. and treasurer of school district No. 91 which the 
plaintiff contends was never organised. The findings in the trial 
court _ were that school district No. 8 of .Pratt County was regularly 
organ.ized and included the city of Preston, a city of the third class 
and for a number of years maintained a graded school; that the school 
district No. 22 was regularly organized and had a boundary contiguous 
to that of school district No. 8 for three and one-half miles; that 
10. Kansas Reports . Vol. 105, P• 134. 
r 
school district No. 8 and No. 22 were consolidated in 1920 and were, 
therefore, known as school district No. 8; that in June, 1920, a 
petition was .presented to the county superintendent, signed by 
residents of the territory, praying for the organization of a new 
school district to include a large portion of the territory of the 
old district No. 22; that on august 21 , 1920, the county superinten-
dent refused to create a new school district as prayed for and made 
an order for the formation of another school district having 
boundaries different than those described in the petition, from 
which order an appeal was at once taken to the board of commissioners; 
that on September 7, 1920, the appeal was sustained by the commission-
ers and an order was ma.de creating a school district as prayed for 
in the petition; and tb.a.t afterward the defendants were elected by 
the new school district, director, treasurer and clerk, respectively, 
and have acted as such continuously since the election. Judgment in 
the trial court was in favor of t he defendant and the plaintiff 
appealed. 
The opinion of the ccurt was delivered by Marshall, J • . He statess 
"The authority of the county superintendent to create new 
districts does not seem to be curtailed.----- after consolida-
tion, the authority of the county superintendent was the same 
as it WO'uld have been if no colsolidation had taken place. 
Other consolidations m~ be made, or new districts m~ be 
created." (11) 
11. Kansas Reports. Vol. 112, P• 60. 
by the county superintendent. If approval of boundaries 
followed instead of preceding signing of the petition, the 
proceeding was irregular and not void." (12) 
The statute provides different methods for forming a joint 
school district by creating a new school district from territory 
lying -in more than one county, and for forming a joint school 
district by attaching land in one county to a.n existing district 
in another and for altering the boundaries of a joint district 
already formed. The act making regulations covering ordinary 
school districts applicable where territory is ·sought to be trans-
ferred from one rural school di st:t'ict to another, authorizes· such 
transfer alt hough the application therefore is not signed by its owners 
or occupants·. .And no question at all concerning the existing 
obligations of either territory enters into the policy concerning 
territory to be included. 
In the case of the State of Kansas ex rel. Charles B. Griffith , 
Attorney General, vs. Rural High. School Joint District No. 8 of 
Wabaunsee and Shawnee Counties, in wh.ich an effort was made to 
enlarge the Rural High School Joint District No. 8 of Shawnee and 
Wabaunsee Counties, an injunction was brought by the attorney 
general in the name of the state to. enjoin the execution of the 
order for enlargement. In the syllabus of the court, it was shown 
12. Kansas Reports. Vol. 113, P• 441. 
that the two rural high school distr i cts each had outstanding bonds 
which 'M:>uld possibly be impared by t he de t aching of territory from 
either of tb.em. 
The opinion of t he cou.rt a s render ed by Mason , J ., is that: 
"A final Objection to the validi ty of t he order changing 
boundaries i s t hat improvement bonds of the two Wabaunsee 
County Rural High School Distri cts were outstanding, the 
obligations of which would be impai red by detaching ter ri-
t ory from t hese districts. The probl em of the adjustment of 
existing debts as between t he di stri ct s cr eating them and 
territory detached t herefrom, is one t o be worked out 
under the statutes relating to that subject. It does not 
enter into the question of the policy to be followed in 
regard to the territory which shoul d be embr aced within 
a particular district." (13) 
In the organization of a rural high school , it is understood 
that the voters of the district e st ablish the district at one 
election duly held for that purpose and at a l ater elect ion desig-
nate a location for the school building 01· site and issue bonds 
top~ for t he erection of t be pl ant. 
In the case of T. B. Matthews vs . Rural Hi gh School District 
No. 5 of Johnson and Miami Counties , it appears that in February 
1920, a petition of the e1ectors was presented to the board of 
commissioners, asking it to call a spec ial election to vote on the 
proposition to establish and locate a rur al hi gh school district, 
composed of certain described terri t ory. The petition specified 
13. Xa.neas Reports. Vol. 117, P• 332. 
the location at Spring Rill. The commissioners granted the petition 
and ordered the special meeting should be held to vote upon estab-
lishing and locating a rural high school, the building therefor to 
be within the city of Spring Hill. The notice was published and 
posted, but the notice omitted aJ:Jj mention of the city of Spring 
Hill as the location or site of the high school. From the holding 
of the meeting, the district was established. Later the board 
purc hased land in and ad.joining the city as a site f or the building. 
No steps were taken for the erection of a building until later. At 
that time an election was called for voting bonds to build the 
schoolhouse and the notice of the election included the proposition 
that the building was to be erected on the land owned-by the scllool 
district. The proposition carried and shortly afterward the bonds 
were sold. The contract was let for the bu.ild ng before a:n.y 
questions were raised. 
The question now raised by a ta.xp~er was that there was no 
effective vote fixing the location or site of the building at Spring 
Hill. 
The opinion of the court, delivered by Johnson, c. J., was: 
"The location or site might and do,ubtless would have been 
fixed by the· vote cast at the first election if the matter 
of the location had been included in the notice of election. 
The remlt of the omission was that nothing more than the 
establishment of the district was determined at that election. 
Under the statute all the propositions, including establish-
ment, locating and voting of bonds to provide means for a 
school building, might have been submitted at a single 
election if proper notice of the proposition had been given. 
However, it was competent for the voters to first determine 
a single question, whether a di strict should be established 
and leave to the latter election the propositi on of location 
or site of the building and the issuance of bonds top~ 
for it. 11 (14) 
Closely related to this is another case testing the law that the 
ru.ral school district ca.w:i.ot change school site without the vote 
of the electors of t he district. 
In this case, Olin G. Cline et al ., vs. w. G. Wettstein et al., 
a mandamus to compell the School .District No . 24, Stevens CoUllty, 
to construct and erect two school houses in the district and to 
maintain the two, schools for the year, it is shown. that the district 
in March voted bonds for a new school building; after a special 
meeting in M~ in which a proposition to build two new buildings 
on separate sites had been considered and vote down, the board 
attempted to carry out the expression of t he voters. The old 
bu.ildiXJg had been torn down and preparation for the new building 
had commenced upon the old site. The proposition at the previous 
meetings b.avillg failed, the board was building the one building 
upon its own property, the old school site , when the writ was 
served upon it to cease and show wey it should not build the two 
buildings. 
In the opinion of the court, delivered by Porter, J., he 
14. Kansas Reports. Vol. 120, P• 347. 
quotes Chief Justice Johnson; 
"Can it have been intended that after a tax has been voted, 
contracts made and teachers employed, ten ta.xpeyers who 
failed to attend or who were outvoted at the annual meeting, 
can on request, require another meeting to be called and 
another test of strength taken on one or more of the pro-
positions? If at the annual meeting, directions were given 
to put a new roof or to make other repairs on a school house , 
after the contract has been let, a resident builder 
who failed to get the job, procure nine others to join him 
in a petition and have the qu.est~on reopened and the 
contracts, partially executed, annu.led? If questions which 
provoke controversy, like the selection of a site, could 
be reopened whenever ten disappointed taxpayers might ask 
for another vote, dissention and disorder would prevail in 
ma.cy school districts much of the time." (15) 
It is a general opinion that in case the district cannot 
decide upon the boundaries, the question may be appealed to the 
county superintendent and the county body of commissioners. As 
a final arbitrator in the matter, t he state superi ntendent may 
act in case the afore mentioned officials cannot come to a 
conclusion. But that tile state superintendent has no authority 
to approve boundaries of districts in more than one county until 
the superintendent and commissioners fail to agree. 
In the case of the State of Kansas ex rel., vs. Jess w. 
Miley, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al., it 
appears that the County Superintendent, Geo. A • . Allen, and the 
commissioners of Coffey County, without any authority for so doing, 
attempted to approve boundaries of the proposed Leroy Rural High 
15. Kansas Reports. Vol. 99, p. 404. 
School District No . 4, Coffey County, Kansas; that none of the 
electors had peti t .ioned for the approval of these boundaries; 
that the appeal was made to the State Superintendent, Jess. w. 
Miley, for final arbitration. The plaintiff in the case seeks 
to enjoin Jess w. Miley from hearing t he appeal concerning the 
organization of the proposed rural high school di strict and to 
enjoin all the other defendants from any manner participating in 
the further organization or attempt to organize t he rural high 
school district. 
The opinion of the court as given by Marshall , J., is that: 
"----the state superintendent of public instruction has no 
authority to act until there has been a disagreement between 
the county superintendent and ·boards of county commissioners 
of two or more counties concerning the boundaries of proposed 
rural high schools. Under the allegations of the petition, 
the state superintendent of public iv truction was under-
taking to act without authority and the state could maintain 
an action to restrain him." (16) 
As a final thought in the planning of the school district let 
us consider that the power of the legislature is to change any 
boundaries of school districts and apportion property. 
In the first part of t he chapter it was considered that school 
district organizations were quasi-corporations, acting by authority 
of the state. This means that such are entities of the state, 
thereby placi.cg the state in an authorative position. 
16. Kansas Reports. Vol~ 120, P• 321. 
In the case of the Board of Education of the City of Topeka, 
vs. the State of Kansas and School District No. 22, as appealed to 
the supreme court, the Kansas Permanent School Fu.nd seeks to recover 
a series of bonds from School District No. 22 of Shawnee County . 
Findings in the case show that in august , 1889, the city of Topeka, 
by an ordinance extended its boundaries to include a large portion 
of the adjoining territory of school district No. 2·2 and annexed 
to the city that part of the district on which the school house 
stood. The bonds which the plaintiff seeks to recover are those 
of school district No. 22, issued prior to -the annexation act 
of the city of Topeka, and f or the purchase of the school site 
a.Dd building. .Agreements were made between the two contracting 
bodies, upon annexation, as to the liabilities upon the payment of 
the bonds. 
In 1893, an act was passed by the legislature entitled& 
"An Act relating to, cities of the fi rst and the second class 
providing f'or the settlement between a school district or a part 
of a district and a city, when annexed by the extension of the 
city limits, providing th.at when all the territory of a school 
district is annexed to a city all its property ab.all be trans-
ferred to the board of education of such a city and the latter be 
held responsible thereafter for the valid floating and bonded debt 
of the district". 
The opinion of the court as delivered by Smith, J .: 
11 lt is within the constitutional power of tb.e legislature 
when a part of the territory of a school district upon 
which a schoolhouse is situated is taken into a city to 
charge the latter with the p~ment of bonds issued by the 
district to build the schoolhouse, although the city should 
annex no more than the site of the building•" (17) 
17 . Kansas Reports. Vol. 64, P• 6. 
CONCLUSIONS 
School districts are governed by the legislative acts 
creating them. They are quasi-corporations, rather than cor-
porations proper, and act, primarily, as political subdivisions, 
or as agencies of civil government. They are created by statute 
to enable them to more readily perform their public duties. 
School districts are held valid, but have no vested corporate 
rights as against the state. 
The notice of election for organization mu.st define the 
territory to be included in the district. 
In the formation of a new district, terri tory may be taken 
from a consolidated terri to,ry . 
In the notice of election for a new district t he description 
of bOUJldaries is held to be sufficiently certain. 
The organization without a written notice is upheld where 
parties have had actual notice. 
The statute concerning the creation of a district on petition 
and vote of electors is no grant of legislative power. 
The county superintendent has authority, under statute, to 
organize a new school district. 
An omission to recite the boundaries of a new district which 
was approved by the coW1ty superintendent does not invalidate the 
organization. 
The question of existing obligations does not enter into t he 
policy concer ning territory to be included in the district . 
The district may be established at one election, and t he 
establishment of the site and the declaration of t he bond issue 
at another. 
The ru.r al school district cannot change the school site 
without the vote of the electors of the district . 
The state superintendent of public instruc tion has no authority 
to approve boundaries of school distri cts in mor e than one county , 
until the county superintendent and cou.nty commissioner s fail ~o 
agree. 
The stat e legislature has the power to change the bou.ndar ies 
of school districts aod to apportion property. 
OH.APTER III 
PREPARING OF THE SCHOOL BUDGET 
The state law reads, Ch. 79, Art . 2925, "This act shall apply 
to all taxing subdivisions or municipalities of the state, including 
counties, cities of the first , second and third class, townships, 
(except townships in counties having the county road unit system 
and having an annual e.xpendi-ture of less than <iP200 , which township 
shall be exempt from the prov isions of this act) , school districts 
of all types, community high school districts, drainage districts 
and li orary boards"; Oh. 79, Al't . 2926 , "------The state tax com-
mission shall prepare and furnish forms for the an.nu.al budgets of 
common-school districts, rural high school d i stricts , community 
high school districts, all high school_ districts located outside of 
cities of the first and second class, and townships as herein 
prescribed in this act.------- The said tax commission shall 
deliver the form for all school districts within each county to the 
superintendent of schools within each county who shall immediately 
deliver copies to the clerk of the respective school districts and 
boards of education within each county.---- It shall be the duty, 
and it is required th.at the governing oody of such taxing subdivision 
or municipality within the state to prepare, make and publish the 
financial statement and budget required oy this act;° Ch. 79, 
There are but few times in which the contesting of this law 
has been carried to the supreme court for its interpretation. There 
is only one case which is of interest to us in thi s di scu.ssion. In 
this particular case, D. 1 . Voshell vs. Anton Peterson, as Clerk of 
McPherson County, the plaintiff, a taxpav7er of School District 
No. 30 of McPherson County, brought the action to enjoin the alleged 
illegal tax levy which tb.e defendant clerk was about to spread upon 
the tax rolls of the school district. 
After the bu.dget had. been ad.opted by the district at its 
annual meeting in due courae of legal procedure and the same 
delivered to the county clerk as prescribed by law, he made an 
independent calculation and reduced the bu.dget. The ri ghts of 
both parties is not questioned in the case, the facts developed 
with the decision of the trial court, that the l evy by the clerk 
was not sufficient. 
The opinion of the court , gi ven by Dawson, J. is: 
.. ----another reason wby some of the justices of this court 
cannot approve t he judgment of the trial court may be added 
here; the constitution contains a mandate to the legislature 
to establish, encourage and maintain a system of public 
schools. That mandate has been loyally executed from the 
foundation of the state. The oash-basis law of 1933 is 
intended to put the financial affairs of the common schools 
upon .the solid foundation -- upon a pay-as-you-go-basis. 
The judgment of the trial court completely defeats that 
legislative purpose. If the injunction complained of were 
permitted to stand, school district No . 30 could not possibly 
maintain a school and pay the expenses thereof in conformity 
with the cash-basis law during the autumn of 1936 . .. (2) 
2. Kansas Reports. Vol. 142, P• 448. 
The Cash Ba.sis Law affecting the school budget, reads, Ch. 
10, Art. 1101, "The following words, terms and phrases, when applied 
in this act, shall for the purpose of this act, have the meanings 
respectively ascribed to them in this section, except in those 
instances a different meaning, "municipality", shall be constru.ed 
and held to mean county, township, city, board of education, 
municipal university, school district, high school district, drain-
age district and any other similar political subdivision or taxing 
district of the state. The words "governing body0 , shall be con-
strued and held to mean board of county commissioners of any county, 
township board of any township, mayor and councilmen or board of 
commissioners of any city, board of education of any city, school 
board of 81J3 school district, board of trustees of any high school 
board, board of regents of a.ey municipal university, board of 
directors of a.ny drainage district, board of park commissioners of 
aey city and any other body or board of a municipality, having 
authority under the laws of this state to create indebtedness against 
3 
the municipality. ---"; Ch. 10, .Art. 1102, ''.£11 municipalities are 
required to pey or refinance their valid indebtedne ss as in this 
act provided, in the manner and at the times herein set forth , and 
to contract no indebtedness after M~ 1, 1933, except as herein 
provided. It is hereby declared that the pu~pose of this act is to 
provide for the funding and payment of all legal debts and obligations 
3. General Statutes of Kansas. 1935, P• 98. 
except present bonded indebtedness of all municipalities and f or 
the future conduct of the financial affairs of such municipality 
4 
upon a cash basis ." 
Like the school bud.get law, the cash basis law has but a very 
few trial cases in the matter referred to the supreme court for 
interpretation. These cases are purely trial cases, contesting 
the constitutionality of the measure. Only one case with interest 
in our discussion, mEcy be cited; that of the State of Kansas, ex rel., 
Roland Boynton, Attorney General, vs. the Board of Education of the 
City of Topeka, 
The syllabus of the trial court read; "constitutional law--
validity of Cash Basis Statute-Contract Obligations--Division of 
Tax Revenue. In a proceeding questioning t he validity of a recent 
legislative measure (house bill No. 745) , the statute is examined 
and held not to be invalid for any of the reasons suggestede Original 
proceedings in mandamus. Opinion filed April 29, 1933 . Write to 
5 
issue, on pra.ecipt." 
Following t he appeal to the supreme court, the op inion of the 
court was delivered by Harvey, J. He reviewed the case in all its 
possibl e phases and held with the trial court. 
4. General Statutes of Kansas. 1935, P• 99. 
5. Kansas Reports . Vol . 137, P• 451. 
CONCLUSIONS 
After the budget has been ad.opted by the electors of the 
school district, it is the duty of the clerk of the school board 
to present it to the county commissioners for the consideration of 
that bod,y, which will hand it to the county clerk for him to spread 
upon the tax rolls. 
The legislative acts concerning the finances of the school, 
popularly known as the "Cash Basis Law", have been held valid by 
the interpretation of the supreme court . 
CHAPTER IV 
BUILDING PROGRAM 
It is generally understood that the members of the school 
board, as such, are representatives of that covporate body, and 
will act within the good faith of that body~ In some particular 
instances it cannot act without the direct authority of the body, 
called into a meeting and operating as an entity. In such a case 
is that of the school board being unable to build a schoolhouse 
Wlless it has first been legally authorized to do so. Such is 
shown in the case of William Brown and Willis Jackson vs. the 
School ~istrict No. 80, of Graham County, Kansas. 
Brown and Jackson, in this case, brought SI.lit against the school 
board to collect for the building of a schoolhouse, preswnedly for 
School District No. 80 of Graham County. The petition alleged the 
making of the contract with tb:e school board, and the construction 
in accordance therewith of a schoolhouse. The liability of the 
school district is the only question presented by the record. The 
findings in this case were unable to show in the record any evidence 
of authority vested in the district board to make the contract in 
question. 
The opinion of the court, offered by Garver, J. was: 
"Having only limited authority in a matter of this kind, the 
officers of a school district ca.n only carry out the expressed 
will of the electors of the district. If they act without such 
direction, or exceed the power conferred upon them, their action 
does not bind the district . They have no inherent power as a 
board to build a schoolhouse, or to create aziy district liability 
in a matter that is committed by the statute exclusively to the 
qualified voters of the district . This statute also confers upon 
the electors of a school district the exclusive right and power 
to select a site for the district schoolhouse. After the voters 
of a district at a meeting duly called, have selected a site 
for the schoolhouse, have determined what kind of a house they 
will build, and have provided funds for that purpose , the district 
board as mere agents may carry out the will of the inb.abi tant's 
of the district so expressed.----- Anyone dealing with the 
board is bound to take notice of the limitations of its authority. 
Hence, in order to base a recovery upon a contract entered into 
with a school board, su.ch as alleged in thi s case, it must be 
shown that the contract was authorized by the voters of the 
district.----- We are unable to find in the record any 
evidence of authority in the district board to make the contract 
in question." (1) 
In the program of building as set upon by the state laws and 
as is practiced by the school districts, it is considered that 
ea.ch district must own c:l.lld operate its own building. In some par-
ticular cases it has been found proper and legal that two or more 
districts m~ consolidate, in which occasion the building site 
of one or the otner may be considered as thdt of and belonging 
to the consolidated district. 
In the organizing of some rural high schools, the district 
embodying that of an ardinary school district, it seemed logical 
and advisable to use the one builaing for the two schools. But this 
practice the law does not permit. Rural high school and ordinary 
1. Kansas Report, Court of .Appeals. Vol. 2, P• 309. 
school districts cannot unite in construction of a school bu.ilding 
for their joint use. 
In tne case of A. T. Stewert vs. c~ H. Gish et al., A. T. 
Stewert, a taxpayer, having interest within the school district, 
brought action against the officers of the rural high school 
district to enjoin the issuance of bonds for the erection of a 
high school building, and ·against tbe officers of a school district 
to enjoin them in the erection of a school building to be used by 
both organizations . He was denied relief in the trial court a.nd 
p.ppealed. 
The opinion of the court as given by Mason, J. is that: 
"Whilst it is possible that there might be some saving in 
this arrangement at the start, it is evident t hat in the 
long run, complications might arise which would compel the 
abandonment of the use of the property by the common school 
district . It is better that both the spirit and language of 
the statute should be observed and that the common school 
buildings should be devoted exclusively to the purpose for 
which it is intended. 
Inasmuch as the rural high school district and the ordinary 
school district are separate organizations, we think that 
without express legislative authority, they have no power 
to join in the erection of a schoolhouse for their common 
benefit . The situation that would be created, involving a 
divided control , no division being made for determining 
what course should be persued if a difference of opinion 
should arise in some matter or pol icy relating to the use 
or the care , preservation or :improvement of the building, 
is so a.,n.runalous that we cannot regard the authority to enter 
into such an arrangement as fairly inferable from that 
granted to eacn to erect a schoolhouse for its own use. 
It is true that in a particular case no difficulty in adminis-
tration might arise . But the possibility of the plan here 
sought to be followed out is so open to debate, that we feel 
constrained to hold tbat until further legislation on this 
subject, a single building mey not be erected by the two 
districts for their common use." (2) 
In very close relationship to building, comes that of remodel-
ing and improving . In aey number of instances the two mey be 
considered as one as rar as tne legal set up is concerned. But 
that of repair upon the buildings is farther related and will need 
be considere4 separately . The right to remodel and improve is not 
implied from authority to repair as shown in the case of c. F. 
Conklin and another, vs. School District 37, etc. -.A school district 
is bound by t he contract of its board for repairs of its school-
house and that notwithstanding that, at the annual meeting , a 
given sum was voted for certain specified repairs, and such sum 
had already been expended in such repai rs. 
In this case, the plaintiffs repaired a door of t he building, 
and painted over some obscene writing upon the walls. They 
billed the school board for five dollars. The contention of the 
school board is that the district board is limited to the amount 
of the money voted for repairs at the school meeting , and to the 
kind of repairs specified in such vote, and the testimoey shows 
that the board had already exhausted the moneys voted for the re-
pairs specified , and claims that the powers of the board were 
exhausted and toe contract not binding upon the board. 
2. Kansas Reports . Vol . 109 , P• 206 . 
case: 
Justice Brewer, J., gives this decision of the court in the 
"The district is a _corporation with the usual powers of a 
corporation for public purposes and the board is its managing 
authority. True, its powers are few and limited, but still 
reasonable construction mu.st be given to the powers which are 
granted. And where a duty is imposed, especially one so 
vital as this to the well being of the district , it will be 
understood that it is to be performed in the ordinary manner 
and by the ordinary means. It Will be noticed by the law, 
that when the board builds, hires or purchases a schoolhouse, 
it is expressly stated th.at it shall be done nout ot the f'u..Dds 
provided for that purpose"; but no such limitation is expressed 
when the duty is cost of the care and keeping of the school-
house . The reason is obvious. In mere matters of repairs 
and preservation, there is little room for expenditure; in 
building, hiring or purchasing, there may be great extravagen-
ces. Again it is the very nature of repairs that they cannot 
be foreseen, and necessary amount determined in advance. 
Who can tell when and to what extent just such injuries as 
appear in this case will occur? Discretion as to these 
matters must be vested somewhere and nowhere more appropriately 
than in the district board. and so we Ullderstand the 
legislature has provided.n (3) 
It is in accordance with the law, and understood by those in 
charge of public funds, that when a building program is necessary, 
it is advisable that the contractor of such a building be placed 
under bond to guarantee complete and satisfactory execution of 
that contract. It is not at all unusual to write within the con-
tract of construction that such a bond is required for the faith-
ful performance of the work , with so.ch securities as the board mey 
approve. Such a clause, so inserted, becomes a part of the contract. 
The execution of such a contract cannot be until the details of 
every clause is met . 
3. Kansas Reports . Vol. 22, P• 521. 
Such a case is that of H. J. Vandenberg et al., vs. the 
Board of Education of Wichita. 
In this case, the city of Wichita, desirous of erecting a 
school building costing approximately $170,000, received bids and 
accepted the offer of the H. J. Vandenberg & Son for the erection 
of the building. In the contract offered the H. J. Vandenberg 
&: Son, signed by both contracting parties, was the clause, "The 
owner shall have the right to require the contractor to give 
bond covering the faithful performance of the contract, and the 
p~ment of all obligations arising thereunder, in such form as the 
owner may prescribe and with such sureties as he may approve." 
The lnilding company executed bonds and presented them to t he 
board for its acceptance. The bonds were exami ned by a committee 
of the board acting with its attorney whicu caused a rejection 
of same and a declaration by the board that the contractor had 
failed to comply with the conditions of t l1e award and that such 
contract was rescinded. At this,· the contracting company sued the 
school board, demanding an execution of its contract. 
The decision of the court, given by Marshall, thata 
"The defendant had the right to approve the bond and the 
right to exercise discretion in that approval. The defendant 
was not compelled to accept whatever bond the plaintiffs should 
offer, even if it were good, but could insist on a satis-
factory bond being given, capricious or in bad faith. The 
objection made by the board to the bonds tendered cannot 
be said to have been unreasonable, capricious or in bad 
faith, because in the event of an action on the bonds to 
recover therefrom, if the surety companies had pleaded that 
the bonds had been executed without authority, the defendant 
might have been unable to prove that they had been executed 
with aut~ority . Because the bond offered was not approved, 
the contract did not become binding on the defendant and for 
that reason the plaintiffs cannot recover any damages that 
may have been sustained by them. 11 ( 4) 
As mentioned in t he previous discussion, the reading of the 
bonding clause is more or less universal. However, it does happen 
that this clause may be written a number of different ways . The 
reading of a number of them is "Give bond according to the state 
law of the State of Kansas ." The condition upon whi ch liability 
depends as written in the state law is stated in t hese words, 11 if 
the said principal shall faithfully perform such contract according 
to the terms, covenants and conditions thereof". A contract 
reading for a bond that contractor will "faithfully perform" contract, 
implies more than merely p~ ing for the material and labor. 
This is decided in the case of H. c. Hensley and o. G. 
Brosius as Partners, etc., vs. School District No. 87 of Anderson 
County, and the Equitable Surety Company. In this case the 
school dis t rict entered into contract with a J. T. Allen for the 
building of a schoolhouse. Allen gave bond, executed by the 
Eauitable Surety Company, conditioned for his "faithful performance 
thereof". He failed to complete the building , and a number of 
mechanic's liens were filed against it. The school district sued 
4. Kansas Reports . Vol . 117, P • 48 . 
the Surety Company and obtained a judgment covering all the 
mechanic's liens against the building a.nd ;ip500 for damages, 
because of the contractor's failure to complete the wilding . The ' 
Surety Company appealed the case, contesting the ~500 item on the 
ground that it was no~ covered by the bond. 
, The opinion of the court, delivered by Mason, J. is in this 
wording: 
• "We think the language of the bond too ex~licit to admit of 
a meaning so far from that naturally to be placed upon it . 
The Surety Company undertook that Allen should faithfully 
perform his contract according to its terms. This is the 
usual scope of a bond of this character • .&. failure to pey 
material men and laborers is only one of a variety of ways 
in which building contractors may violate their agreements. 
The bond here given mu.st be held broad enough in its terms 
to cover the loss resulting from Allen 's abandonment of t he 
building before its completion." (5) 
The means whereby t he building program is financed will be 
discussed in the next chapter. It is the customary practice to 
bond the district then sell the bonds . The next chapter treats 
entirely upon bonding and indebtedness. Occasions may arise in 
which gift s are made for this purpose in connection with the sale 
of bonds. We have one of these cases cited, in which the expendi-
tures of voluntary contributions are mentioned as not being 
prohibited by the statute, providing that such is mentioned in bonding 
and that the cost be within the estimate. 
5 . Kansas Reports . Vol. 97, P• 56. 
In this case, J . M. Wright et al., vs. the Board of Education 
of the city of Leavenworth, the Boa.rd of Education of Leavenworth 
depided to erect a building for industrial-training, and submitted 
to t he voters a proposition to issue f 50,000 in bonds for t hat pur-
pose, finding that sum sufficient, together with $10,000 to be 
contributed by a voluntary organization. Believing the two sums in 
hand insufficient, it levied a two mill tax. in order to bring t he 
available sources up to the requi red amount • ..1n action was 
brought by the taxp~ers to enjoin its further proceedings in 
pursuance of the plan. In the syllabus of t he trial court, six 
different divisions of objections were presented for the considera-
tion of the supreme court. Of this group, we wil l consider but 
the one entering our discussion, that of the statutory restrictions 
preventing the board from accepting and expending upon t he building, 
proceeds contributed to the ~sso_ciation or school district or 
organization. 
The opinion of the court as given by Mason, J. is that: 
"It was not an infringment of t he statute for t he boa.rd to 
provide for the construction of a building at a cost of 
~10 ,000 in excess of the proceeds of ttie bonds and the tax 
upon that amount , being placed at its disposal for such a 
purpose by individuals who were willing to make this contri-
bution to the building fund. Such restrictions to protect 
the taxpayers by limiting their liability in the matter, 
and not to prevent the acceptance and utilization of voluntary 
contributions in aid of public enterprises. This has been 
determined in seve~al cases arising under similar statutes." (6) 
6. Kansas Reports. Vol. 106, P• 469 . 
CONCLUSIONS 
The district school board cannot build a school house unless 
it has been legally authorized to do so. 
_ Rural hjgh schools and ordinary school districts cannot unite 
in construction of a school building for their joint use. 
The right to remodel and improve a school building may not 
be implied from the authority to repair. 
The contract for the erection of a school building is not 
binding upon either party until the bond has been properly 
approved and executed. Neither can a construction company re-
cover where the failure of the school board t o approve a bond was 
not in bad faith. 
A bond in which it is stated that the contractor will 
"faithfully perform" contra.ct implies more than merely p~ing for 
the material and labor. 
A school board may expend voluntary contributions for 
building, providing the cost of the building be within the estimate. 
OH.A.PTER V 
BONDING .AND INDEBTEDNESS 
Ma,y we now turn our attention to the financing of a. school 
program by bonding. As a school district is a quasi-corporation and 
not a. paying oo~o.rration, it is necessary that it depend almost 
entirely upon the receipts from taxation to finance its operation. 
,However, occassions arise in which the receipts are not ad.equate 
and the district finds it necessary to issue and sell bonds for 
that purpose . And, it is usually the practice, that upon building, 
the school district issue a.nd sell bonds for tbat purpose. 
"The call for an election to be held after the creation of a 
school district to vote upon the question of issuing bonds for 
(1) 
building is required to be made by the board of such a district." 
It is within the authority of such a board to issue the notices 
calling the meeting of the district electors for such purposes, 
for without the direction of these electors, it finds itself 
unauthorized to operate in the matter. 
We have an irregularity in this proceedure; that of the opera-
tion of the administrative body of the county high school. In 
this particular case, it is provided, that upon presentation of a 
l . Kansas Re-ports . Vol. 109, P• 206. (previously cited) 
petition of twenty-five percent of the legal voters of a county 
asking for an election of a proposed bond issue to build a county 
high school, it shall become the duty of the board of county comm-
issioners to call such election. 
In the case of The Board of County Commissioners of the County 
of ~reeley vs . w. E. Davis, as State Auditor, etc., the Board of 
County Commissioners of Greeley County applied to the court for a 
writ of mandamus to require the state auditor to register a bond 
issue of $10 , 000 to pa_y for a county high school building 
recently erected in Greeley County, pursuant to a s_r:acial election 
called by the commissioners on May 15, 1916 , and which was held 
on August l, 1916. The auditor declines to register the bonds on 
the grounds that no petition was ever presented to the board of 
county commissioners calling for w.ch a meet ing of the electors 
as was called by the board upon the date of May 15, 1916, and that 
such issuance of bonds is void. In the trial court, the writ was 
denied a.ni the plaintiff appealed to the decision of the supreme cou-t. 
The opinion of the supreme court was given by Dawson, J. as 
follows: 
11 It will be observed that the acts of 1897, 1903 and 1907 
form a complete and independent program for the establishment 
of county high schools and for housing high school pupils 
in counties of less than six thousand population. These 
acts need no aid from the general statutes, authorizing 
county commissioners to determine, at their discretion, the 
necessity for permanent county buildings aDd to call a bond 
election to provide funds therefor • .iW.d. since the high school 
acts provide their own procedure for setting in motion the 
process by which a county high school building mey be procured, 
such processes are exclusive. One of these was the presenta-
tion to the board of county commissioners a petition signed 
by twenty-five percent of the legal voters of the county. Now 
such petition was suomitted, consequently the statutory basis 
on wnich the county board called the election was wanting. 
The election was, therefore, called without lawful authority 
and its result is void. " (2) 
J..n.other irregularity is that of the operation in first and 
second class cities . i~en the city board of education has determined 
the necessity for a school bond election, and has certified its 
action to the city mayor, that officer has no option other than 
to call an election for that purpose . 
In the case of the State of Kansas ex rel., R. c. McCormick, 
as County Attorney etc., et al., vs. o. H. Bentley, as Meyor etc., 
the Wichita Boa.rd of Education made application t o the court f'or 
a writ of manda.rrru.s to compel the ma,yor of the city of Wichita to 
call an election on tb.e proposition to issue bonds for an additional 
high school building required to relieve the congested situation 
of the city schools. The mayor declined to call the eleation 
with the answer that the city had insufficient f'\uids with which to 
m~et the expenses of the election; that it had made no arrangement 
in its fiscal budget for the election, but if the board of education 
would turn over to the city a sufficient sum to stand the expenses, 
2. Kansas Reports . Vol. 99 , p. l . 
he would call the election. This the board of education refused 
to do and asked for satisfaction through the courts. 
The opinion of the court in this matter was delivered by 
Dawson, J . : 
"The Board of Education and the Ui ty are separate corporate 
entities. That their territorial limits largely coincide 
is immaterial . The wisdom and discretion of the board of 
education are not reviewable by the mayor. He is merely the 
ministerial officer designated by the statute to call the 
election. The sheriff or county clerk, if thus designated , 
would answer the purpose just as well . The school board 
determines the necessity of the election. There is nothing 
equ.ivocal touching the meyor's duty . He must call the 
election within thirty days after receipt of the board ' s 
certificate . The plaintiffs are entitled -to the judgment." 
(3) 
In the original mandamus proceedings of the Rural High School 
District No . 1 , of Rush County, by A• L. Farmer as Director etc., 
vs. w. E. Davis as Auditor etc . , the school district trys to compel 
the state auditor to register bonds issued by the district. The 
writ was allowed in the trial court and appealed to the supreme 
court for its interpretation. 
The aud itor resisted the writ upon the grounds tbat the act 
violated section 16 of article 2 of the state constitution; that 
the plaintiff is not a body corporate and has no authority to 
maintain this action; and tbat the provisions of the act are so 
indefinite as to confer no authority to issue :b.onds . 
3 . Kansas Reports. Vol. 98, P• 442 . 
The interpretat ion of the cou.rt as given by Marshall , J . 
is that: 
"This court has often said, concerning this provision, that 
no narrow or technical rule should be adopted to defeat the 
operation of the law, and that it is not necessary that the 
title be a.n abstract of tb.e entire act. --- Before . an act 
of the legislature can be declared invalid, it must clearly 
appear that the act violates some constitutional pDovision. 
---- Observing these rules , we ca.n not say that the establish-
ment of rural high school districts does not include every 
thing that is necessary to organize such school district, 
build schoolhouses and maintain and operate schools. The 
title of the act is not misleading. 1 t is broad enough to 
include authority to vote bonds for the erection of a 
school building. This act is not unconstitutional. The 
rural high school district is placed under the same authority 
and has the same obligations as sc hool districts , with the 
few exceptions as named in the act . Therefore, rural high 
school districts are bodies corporate and have authority to 
sue and be sued . It follows tb.at the plaintiff can maintain 
this action." (4) 
The legislative act of 1923 converted tb.e county high schools 
into community hign schools . In the old coU.llty high school set- up 
the county commissioners , with three members c hosen by the electors 
of the district, constituted the school board, over which the county 
superintendent of public instruction sat as chairman-exofficio. By 
the new law, the personnel of the boa.rd was changed; the county 
commissioner members being relieved of their duties as members. 
This relief of the county commissioner membership was thought to 
change the organization from that of the county to one of a regular 
school district. 
4. Kansas Reports , Vol . 96 , P• 647. 
In the case of The State of Kansas ex rel . , c. B. Griffith as 
Attorney-General, vs. Mrs . Myrtle Newbold et al . as the Board of 
Trustees of the Norton Cou.uty Community High School District, we 
have a case brought by the state on the relation of the attorney-
general to require tb.e board of trustees of the community high school 
in Norton COUD.ty to call an election upon the proposition of issuing 
bonds for the erection of a bUilding, the purpose of which being 
to settle the qu.estion whether t he statutes gives the defendants 
power to do so . 
In the original proceeding, the writ was denied, upon wh ich 
the case was immediately presented to the supreme court for its 
interpretation. 
The following opinion of the court was delivered by Mason, J.: 
"The county high school which in 1923 converted into the 
community high school district here involved, was organized 
under a special act, providing for such organization in 
accordance with a general statute. J.~either the special nor 
the general act author'ized the issuance of bonds to erect a 
building for this county high school and the latter forbade 
the board of trustees to contract for school buildings in 
excess of the amount on hand ani to be raised by one year's 
tax . Clearly the Norton County high school was not included 
in the grant to school districts of power to issue bonds for 
schoolhouses, and its mere conversion into a community high-
school district with restricted boundaries does not in our 
judgment by any p ermissible liberality of construction 
enlarge it authority in this respect. The writ asked is 
denied. " (5) · 
5. Kansas Reports . Vol . 114, P• 485 . 
After a :rural high school has been organized, by legal 
proceedings, but not extending to the purchase of a site and build-
ing, the meeting for the selection of the site and the voting of 
bonds mey be called by the school board upon petition presented 
to such a board. 
_ In the case of s. s. Reynolds, vs. Frank B. Clark et al., as 
the Board of ~rainfield Rural High-School District No. 4, an 
action was brought to enjoin the issuance of bonds voted by the 
rural high school district to enable it to construct a high-school 
building. A temporary injunction was dissolved a.ud the plaintiff 
appealed. 
It was within the finding of the court, that the rural high 
school district had been orga.uized, but the proceedings did not 
extend to the voting of bonds for the purchase of a school site, 
or the selection of a site for the building. It was further s hown 
tha.:b. the school operated for a period of one year, leasing the 
building for its use. In February of 1917, a petition for an 
election to vote bonds for the erection of a building was presented 
to the school board. The board called the election; the election 
was held ani the results favorable to the issuance of bonds for the 
construction of the school building. 
The opinion of the court as delivered by Burch, J. is t hat: 
Greenwood County Rural High-School from issuing bonds in the sum of 
50,000 which the district had voted for the purpose of constructing 
a school building , on the allegation of numerous irregularities in 
the notice of the election. None of these irregularities given in 
the syllabus are of interest to us in this discuss ion, excepting 
number four, which reads that "The district officers' names were 
not signed to the election notices." 
The findings of the court in this instance were that the officers 
names were all upon the notice, which had been furnished by the state 
department for such purposes; that such officers names had all been 
written by one hand, that of, presumedly , the clerk, anu such signa-
tures were in iDk and had been written by the direction of the 
other members. 
The ruling of the court as given by Dawson, J. is that: 
"The third defect urged was that tbe officers of the district 
did not sign the notices -- that one of them signed the names 
of the others. But the others sanctioned the signatures, which 
were written in their presence . It is familiar law that where 
a.person's name is signed for him at his direction and in his 
presence by another, the signature becomes his own, and has 
precisely the same validtity as if he had written it himself." 
(7) 
In this same case, another thought is brought out quite 
vividly by the decision of the judge, and perhaps attention should 
be called to it . In discussing the operation of the notice he seys: 
ttThe statute says, that printed or typewritten notices of bond 
election shall be posted on the door of each school house in 
7. Ibid . 
district. ------ The notice itself is, of course, mandatory." 
(8) 
Among other irregularities in tbe proceedure for petitioning 
for bond election is that of the elapse of time between the posting 
of the notice of election a.rxi the election proper. This period 
is definitely mentioned in the statute and most school boards follow 
it closely. However, in some cases of emergencies it has been 
found impossible to do so. Then the question of the legality of 
the election arises . In this particular case, Ru.ral High School 
District No. 101 of Jefferson County, ex rel. Bert Metzger, as 
Director etc., vs. w. E. Davis as State Audi tor, etc., the bonds o-f 
the school district were held to be invalid because the notice of 
the meeting to authorize them wa s not published for the time re-
quired by tbe state statute. In the original proceedings in 
mandamus the trial court denied the wi i t. It was then appealed to 
the supreme court for registration. 
The opinion of the court as given by Mason, J. follows: 
11 The proposition to issue the bonds received the ma.jori ty 
of votes, but not a majority of all wno were entitled to vote, 
although more than sixty percent of the electors had signed 
the petition for the election. Therefore, it cannot be said 
that the omission to publish tbe notice for the prescribed 
time could not possibly have affected the result. Whatever 
might be the rule otherwise, in such a situation the defect 
has been expresely adjudged to be fatal. The bonds having 
been issued without valid authority, the auditor properly 
refused to register them. In the brief in behalf of the 
district, an argument is made based upon the in~onvenience 
and injustice that will result from a decision holding the 
a. ~, 742. 
organization to be invalid. The legal existance of the 
district, however, is not involved in this proceeding. The 
writ asked for is denied. " (9) 
It is generally understood that when bonds a.!'e issued by 
school boards, they specify on their face for just what purpose 
they a.!'e issued . In some instances this is not true and no 
oo~test has been entered to determine their validity . In other 
cases, particularly when such bonds have been presented to the state 
School Fund for sale, their validity have been contested and such 
irregula.!'ity brought before tbe courts . 
In the case of the State of Kansas vs. School District No. 3 
Chautauqua County, action is brought by tne State School Fund 
Commission to collect upon bonds sold by the School District No. 3 
of Chautauqua County. In one of its reason for not peying upon 
same, the school district defends that t he bonds did not state upon 
their face tbe purpose for which they were issued and from wh ich 
particular fund they were to be paid. Through error £rem the 
Chautauqua District Court, the case went to the supreme court f or 
trial . The opinion of the court as g iven by Valentine, J., is that: 
"In this case ---- it must be considered that these bonds were 
issued in good faith; that the school district received ample 
compensation for them; for nothing appears contrary in the 
petition, and all the allegations in the petition would tend 
to indicate this . We have stated that the bonds do not in 
terms specify upon their face the purpose for which they were 
9 . Kansas Reports . Vol . 98, P• 200. 
issued; but we think they do in effect. The bonds specify 
upon their face that they were 11 issued in pursuance of an act 
of the legislature of the state of Kansas , entitled an Act 
to enable School Districts in the State of Kansas to issue 
bonds, approved February 26, 1866 and acts aroendatory and 
supplementary thereto." Now under that act bonds could be 
issued only for one purpose--that of providi.og a school house 
for the district, eitner by erecting or purchasing the same. 
It is true that was not necessary that the bonds snould 
recite the act under which they were issued, and it was necessary 
that they should recite the purpose for which they were issued; 
but as the bonds did recite the act under which they were 
issued, and as that act authorizes bonds to be issued only 
for one purpose , the bonds do in effect recite the purpose 
for which they were issued." (10) 
After school bonds have been issued it is the duty of the state 
auditor to register them. Because of the carefulness in which 
these bonds are prepared, seldom ever is this registration refused. 
However, in some cases the auditor feels unable to register them, 
at which time they are contested and brought before the courts, 
or action is brought against the auditor co cause an explanation 
for his action in same . 
Such is the case of J. c. Fisher et al., vs. w. E. Davis as 
State Auditor etc., in which the school district tried to compel 
the auditor to register certain rural high school bonds . The 
auditor refused on the grounds that the district had an appeal 
from injunction proceedings still pendi.og . 
The findings in the case were, that at election the proposi-
tion to vote bonds carried, how-ever , the notice of the election 
10. Kansas Reports . Vol. 34, P• 237 . 
proved fatally defective under the statute; that upon the 
attention of the board of commissioners being challenged to this 
defect, and the pet ition again being pr esented, that board, upon 
the same petiti on, ordered another election; tba.t this election 
carried. After the last election, an action was brought in the 
District Court of Stafford County against the high school to 
enjoin the issuance of the bonds. The action was tried and judg-
ment rendered in favor of the defendants . An appeal was then 
filed in the supreme court and was pending at tb.e time this case 
was brought against tne auditor demanding him to register the bonds. 
The opinion of the court as delivered by Marshall , J. is to 
the effeat that: 
"When a proper petition is filed under the statute it becomes 
the duty of the board of coU.11ty commissioners to call a 
special election to vote on establishiug and locating a rural 
high school anQ to vote bonds for the construction of a high 
school building. That petition is effective until the re-
quirements of the statute· have been complied with . The 
requirements of the statute are not complied with until 
a valid election is held. In the present case the first 
election to vote the bonds was invalid. The petition was 
still active. When the attention of the board of the county 
commissioners was challenged to the defective election that 
board had authority, without a new petition being presented, 
to call a special election to vote bonds for the construction 
of a high school building. ~or this reason the board of 
county commissioners was acting under the law when the second 
election was ordered. --- The fact that the appeal is pending 
is not sufficient excuse to warrant the auditor in refusing 
to register the bonds ." (11) 
11 . Kansas Reports . Vol . 98 , P• 696 . 
In dealing witn bonds, it is to be considered that they are 
negotiable instruments, and should come under the control of the 
National Negotiable Instrument Law. The question sometimes arises 
as to just how valid these bonds are when placed under the applica-
tion of this law. To be valid and negotiable, such instruments 
must come under the requisites of this law. Such is sited in t he 
case of School District o. 40 of Finney County vs. H. w. Cushing 
in which Cushing received judgment against the school district for 
~505.70, and the defendant appealed the case in error. 
The finding s of the court were, that these bonds had been 
issued in blank, thus came into being under law as bearer paper; 
that Cushing had become a holder in due course and in good faith. 
The following opinion of the court as delivered by Milton, J.: 
"The statute under which the bonds ~ Jre issued p rovides that 
such bonds shall be signed by the director and countersigned 
by the clerk and after registration by the county clerk, shall 
be negotiable and transferrable by delivery, and may be 
disposed of by t he district board at no less than ninety-five 
cents on the dollar. Unier this provision such bonds can 
certainly be payable to bearer, or to some particular person 
or bearer. It is evident that the legisla ture intended to 
make bonds of this character negotiable." (12) 
In the discussion of bonding and indebtedness, it may be 
Froper that we take up at tnis time the question of limitation 
of bonded indebtedness . The statute reads (Ch. 10, Art . 301. 
Gen. Statutes of Kansas, 1935), "Except for the refunding of 
12 . Kansas Court of Appeals . Vol. 8, P• 728. 
outstanding debt, including outstanding bonds and matured coupons 
thereof, or judgment t hereon, no bonds of any class or description 
shall hereafter be issued by~ county, township, city board of 
education or sc nool district where the total bonded indeotedness 
of such county or townsnip as snown by the last finding and 
determination by the proper board of equalization, or where the 
total bonaed indebtedness of such city, school district or board 
of education would thereby exceed one and one-fi f th percent of 
such assessment; but this restriction shall not apply to cities 
of the first class." And, then in Ch. 75, Art. 2316, General 
Statutes of' Kansas, 1935, it further states, "That the board of 
school fund commissioners of the State of Kansas is hereby 
authorized and empowered to make an order aut ilorizing any city 
or school district to vote bonds for the purpose of erecting 
school buildings to an amount of not more than one hundred percent 
in excess of, and in addition to, the amount of bonds that may be 
voted under laws now in force." 
Without question, the makers of our laws have been satisfied 
that such limitations on bonded indebtedness were necessary to 
meet the necessities of most sc ~ool districts. However, it has 
made it possible tbat by the special arrang;ement before the state 
school fund commission, a district mey be allowed to go beyond the 
regular limitation. In some cases, under unusual circumstances, 
school boards find that they need to go before the commission 
petitioning for the privilege of issuing bonds in excess of the 
usual limit . Such is the experience of School District No. 88 of 
Shawnee County as shown in the case of H. B. Cowles vs . School 
District 88 of Shawnee County . 
This case was an attempt to obtain an order enjoining the 
issuance of school district bonds . The attack on the execution 
and the sale of the bonds proposed to be issued. was based on the 
claim that the initial steps had not been regularly taken. This 
school district joins the city of Topeka and had a p roperty valua-
tion of f447 , 850 and contained about 213 qualified electors. A 
movement was started to secure a new school house costing about 
fl0,000. Under the bonding limitation law, this could not be 
done so it was understood to be necessary to petition the School 
Fund Commission in the matter. A formal petition was made to the 
school board by electors of the district, asking that the board go 
before the commission, seeking t ~e p ermission to issue excessive 
bonds. The petition was signed by 119 names, received by t he board 
and that board made application according to the p etition. While 
the application was under consideration of the commission, a 
number of electors presented a protest and the mentioned suit at 
law came from that protest. The atta ck was made by t ne thought 
that tnere were not enough signers to the petition and tnat a 
number of those names upon it were not signatures . Some si gners 
chose to withdraw their names and others of tne district liked to 
place their names upon the petition. 
The judgment of the court as given by Jonnson, c. J. wasa 
"The iniatory step was taken by the electors, and their petition 
ad.dressed to the school board, and not to the state board . 
The action of the state board is invoked by the application 
of the school board and a notice of the filing of that 
application is required. The state board does not base its 
find ings and judgment on the petition to the school district, 
but it fixes a day for the hearing and upon the evidence then 
offered, under rules which it prescribes, the application 
is either granted or denied. The purpose of the petition is 
to move t he school board to make application to the state 
board and that purpose has been subserved when the prayer 
of the petition was granted and the application mad.e. 0 {13) 
Another case closely paralleling this one is cited in which 
the general proceedure is not question, but the amount of the issue. 
In this case, The Board of Education of School District No. 42 of 
Brown Uou.nty, vs. w. E. Davis, as State Auditor, registration is 
refused on the ground tnat the issue is in excess of the limit 
prescribed oy law. With the permi s sion of the state school f und 
commission, the school uistrict had issued bonds and presented 
tnem to tne state for registration, and had been refused. 
The decision of the court as given by Burch , J. is that: 
" Vdth the permission of the sc o.ool fund commissioners, the 
board of education of a city of the second class may issue 
bonds for the purpose of erecting school buildings up to a 
maximum limitation of three and three- eights percent. The 
bonds presented for registration are well within that limit." 
13. Kansas .rleports . 
14. Kansas Reports . 
Vol . 88 , P• 603 . 
Vol . 94, P • 670 . 
(14) 
The statutes authorize the school istr1cts to compromise 
and refund their bonded indebtedness "upon such terms as can be 
agreed upon", the agreement referred to is one between the district 
and the owner of the bonds, and the fact that the bonds are held 
by the school fund commission, which is an agency of the state 
and which acquired them by accepting an offer at par wnich the 
statute required to be mad.e, does not authorize a compromise and 
refund without its consent 
In the case of School District No. 78 of Linn County, vs. 
Jess w. Miley et al., as tb.e Board of State School .1:i'u.nd Commiss-
ioner&, and E. T. Thompson as State Treasurer, it is shown that 
the school district was able to borrow money at a lower rate of 
interest than of that which it was paying on its bonds held by 
the commission; that the school district de -ia.nded of the commission 
that it either accept payment of these bonds which it held or that 
it dCCept new bonds bearing a lower rate of interest in exchange. 
The commission refueed the demand and the above mentioned case 
was brought to bring the liquidation of the ol bond issue. 
The op inion of the court, as delivered by Mas on, J. is that: 
"The district is not in a position to pay off the old debt 
except by incurring a new one and although the several steps 
should be ta.ken at the same time ana the cash for the pay-
ment of the present bonds be rod.Cle at once available from the 
sale of new ones, the transaction would still be an exchange 
of creditors and not a reduction of the principal of the debt. 
We hold that the commission is not required either to reduce 
the interest contracted for or in effect to sell the bonds to 
a purchaser who is willing to do so. This view merely means 
that the contract is to be inforced as made. Any apparent 
hardship to the district which it involves is a consequence 
of the rate of interest having been fixed higher than the 
market required or of t he market having been changed." (15) 
In the case of the State of Kansas vs. the City of Lawrence, 
the attorney-general brought action for the management and invest-
me~t of the school fund. The complete syllabus of the court is 
lengthy and irrevelent in its completeness for the need of discussion 
here. However, t here is one point that need be taken from it for 
our d iscussion; that the legisl ature may compromise the debt owing 
to ·the SC tlOOl fund. 
The decision of the court, Smith, Graves, concurring, is: 
"The constitution creates a permanent sc hool-fund commission, 
consisting of the superintendent of public instruction, the 
secretary of state and the attorney general, and declares t hat 
the commission shall have the 'managenumt and investment of 
the school funds".---- The fund of which it is given the 
management and investment is declared to be 'the common 
property of the state'. In our opinion it was not intended 
in establishing the mission to create an independent 
soverignty which should not be amendable to the legislature. 
The constitution establishes the commission just as it creates 
the office of governor. But it reposes the legislative 
power in the legislature. And notwithstanding the constltution 
gives to the 9ffice of governor the executive power of the 
state no one would contend that the legislature is powerless 
to enact laws imposing duties on the governor. Can there be 
no doubt that the legislature has tbe power to declare the 
rate of interest at which the school fund shall be loaned." 
15. Kansas Reports . 
16. Kansas Reports . 
Vol . 114, P• 741. 
Vol. 79 , P• 234 . 
(16) 
CONCLUSIONS 
The call for an election to be held, after the creation of a 
district, to vote on bonds mu.st be made by the district board . 
The authority of the board of county commissioners to call an 
election to vote bonds for high school is determined by the statute 
deali.og with that particular issue . 
In cities of the second class, it is the meyors du~y to call 
the election, upon proper order from the school board. 
The rural high school district mey issue bonds for the erection 
of a high scnool buildi.og. 
Community high schools have no authority to issue bonds as a 
school district . 
Where~ person's name is signed for him at his direction, and 
in his presence, to petition for bond election, it becomes his own. 
The notice of election on bonds is mandatory; and where the 
notice of election uid not comply with the statute, such bond 
issues were invalid. 
Bonds mu.st state upon their face the purpose for which they 
were issued; the statutory recitation is sufficient . 
The state auditor cannot refuse to register bonds because of 
an appeal from injunction proceedings is still pending. 
School bonds are valid, although they m~ be made pa,yable 
to bank or bearer . 
A school district m~ vote bonds in excess of the usual limit 
with the permission of the state school fund commission . Also, 
a district in second class city may issue bonds for building with 
permission of the commission, up to tbree and three-eights percent. 
A school district cannot demand a refundiDg of school bonds 
held by the state school fund commission without its consent . 
OHAFTER VI 
OPERATION 
The control of the operation of the public schools outside of 
ci~ies of the first and second class is by the county superintendent. 
Legislative measures have set up an educational organization, running 
in it~ scope from the State Board of Education to the County 
Superintendent. Certain administrative powers and duties have been 
placed upon each. In general, as far as the local condition exists, 
the control lies within the power of the county superintendent. 
In the case of M. W. Stewart, as treasurer of Wyandott County, 
et al., vs. David J. Adams et al., it is shown that the city of 
Argentine, by the proclamation of its meyor bad enlarged its city 
limits, thereby gathering into its school district, territory of 
another district. At the same time of the enlargement of the city 
it became a city of the second class. The suit is brought by Mr. 
Adams and others againbt the treasurer enjoining the collection of 
taxes for school purposes; Mr. A.dams being a resident of the 
newly joined territory contends that it is illegal to collect the 
taxes assigned against the annexed property ·for the operation of the 
old school organization. There are five divisions in the syllabus 
of the court, but our interest ~ill be directed upon the one dealing 
with the rights of the county superintendent in the matter. 
The opinion of the court delivered by Horton, c. J. follows: 
0 Wb.en the city of Argentine, became a city of the second 
class, it became subject to different laws, both as a muni-
cipality and as a school district. The limits of the school 
district then became coextensive with the limits of the city, 
and territory outside the city limits could be attached to 
such city for school purposes only in the manner prescribed 
by law---- From and after the date of the organization of 
the city of the second class the sc hool board of the annexed 
territory could exercise no authority or perform any act. 11 
(1) 
This discussion and .. the opinion of the judge clearly shows 
the authority of the operat ion of the schools to remain in the 
office of the county superintendent until it is removed to the 
office of the school board of the first or second class city. 
The operation of the immediate district is unaer the control 
of the board of directors of t hat district. The major part of t he 
discussion of t-his chapter will deal with the activities of t h is 
group in the operating of t he school. 
The state law mentions ad~ f or the annual meeting of the 
district, making provisions that special meetings may be called 
under certain circumstances. The interpreta tion of the meaning of 
the word "may 11 (it is optional) has caused questions. In some 
instances, the court has been called upon for an interpretation. 
In such an instance is the case of the State of Kansas, ex rel. 
Fred s. Jackson, as Attorney-general, vs. School District No. 1 
1. Kansas Reports. Vol. 50, P• 560. 
of Edwards County et al . 
In this case the board had, at its regular meeting selected 
a site upon which to place a building. Following th.is action, the 
board had the property appraised. In the meantime some of the 
electors found other property which they considered more suitable 
and which could be purchased at a lower figure. These electors 
petitioned the board for a special meeting so that they might place 
their findings before the electors of the district and ask for a 
re-consideration of the action of the p revious annual meeting. 
The board refused to call the meeting, on the grounds that 
such was not mandatory, and that they did not feel obligated 
to do so. 
The opinion of the court as delivered by Johnston, c. J. is: 
"Should the school board be compelled by a mandamus to call 
a spec-ial meeting of the electors to choose a site for a . 
school building when one has already been designated at a 
meeting duly called ana where the school board, acting on 
that designation, has proceeded to condemn and acquire the 
site selecte<i,1 The statute relating to special meetings 
provides that - special meetings !Ef&_ be called by the district 
board or upon a petit ion signed by ten resident tax:p~ers 
of this district. The contention is that the prmvision 
that special meetings~ oe called by the district board 
-----means that the board not only may, but must,'call 
the meeting upon the presentation of the petition. Fri-
marily and as ordinarily used in the statute the word mey 
is permissive rather than premptory." (2) 
2. Kansas Reports. Vol. 80, P• 667. 
Following the previous discussion, that of meetings called 
upon petition, it might be well to take u-p the discussion as to 
just who is bound to call these meetings. It is the belief of 
t he average elector that this is the dut·y of the director of t he 
school board, but listen to the interpretation of the judge in 
t his case of the State of Kansas ex rel., R. D. Armstrong as 
County Attorney of Scott County vs. w. D. 1uke, as Clerk of School 
District No. 2 of Scott County • 
.A petition was sig:oed by t he certifi_ed number of electors of 
School District No. 2, Scott County, asking the school board to 
call a special meeting to vote upon consolidation. The pe t ition 
was delivered to the clerk of the board by the wife of the director 
of the board. The clerk returned the petition to the wife and 
refused to post the notice of the called meet i ng. He decl~red in 
his refusal that he was not obligated in posting the notice of the 
meeting because the board had no meeting upon t he matter and he 
therefore had no authority in doing so. Mandamus action was 
taken against him to compel him to act in the matter. The d~ 
previous to the serving of the writ upon him, he resigned from his 
office, and the resignition was accepted by the county superintendent 
of schools . The trial court found in favor of the defendant and the 
case was presented to the supreme court for an opinion. 
The opinion of the court as delivered by Marshall, J. is t hat: 
"The statute does not support the defendant in his conten-
tion. The law directs the clerk of the school district to 
post t he notices whenever a petition has been signed by 
twenty-five percent of the voters in the sc hool district. 
The statute does not require action by the school board. 
When the petition is presented to the clerk, it is his du.ty 
not the duty of the board, to call the election." (3) 
The director of the sc hool board is given full control of 
lit,i gation, as s hown in the case of School District No. 116 of 
Sedgwick County vs . School District No . 141 of Sedgwick County. 
The matter for settlement was that of jurisdiction over school 
land, which does not enter into our point . In the trial proceedure 
the · director of the plaintiff board moved to d ismiss the case. 
The attorney for the board, Mr. J. ¼. Adams, res i sted the move. 
This move of the director and the attitude of his attorney is the 
part which is of interest in this discussion. The case was appealed 
to the supreme court in error, and the following is the decision of 
that court given per curiam: 
"Upon the showing made, it does not appear that Mr. Adam's 
appearance or employment in the case was authorized by t he 
school district meeting, or that any provision has been made 
by a.DY school meeting of the district to prosecute t he action . 
It follows, therefore, th~t t he director has full general 
authori t y to represent the district and may control the 
action as fully as an individual mi ght control his own _ 
action . He is assigned the duty to appear for and in behalf 
of the district in all suits brought by or against the 
district, unless other directions shall be given by the voters 
of such district at a district meeting." (4) 
3. Kansas Reports . 
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AJ;zy contracts made by a school board , mu.st be made as by 
that body . In other words , one or other of the members~ not 
bind the actions of the board by his contracting. In the case of 
Sullivan et al., vs. School District No . 39 of Brown County, et al., 
it is shown that the director of the board ma,.v bind that board with 
his signature upon a contract, if at a later time the board or the 
district affirms the contract. 
In this particular case the director of the board contracted 
for the erection of the school building. Before the building was 
completed~ the contractor breached, and left the state . The 
building stood unfinished for some time, then was completed by 
other contractors. Supply houses placed a lien upon the property 
because of the material which they had furnished the former con-
tractor. In this case, the parties holding the lien upon the 
property seek to collect for the materials put forth . ~he question 
involved is that of the unusual way of contracting, and if such a 
contract is legal. 
The opinion of the court was delivered by Valentine, J.: 
"-------Everything seems to have been done, and sufficiently 
done that was necessary to entitle the plaintiffs to their 
mechanics lien, except that the original contract made by Mr. 
Eley, the former contractor, and tne school district was not 
made in the manner prescribed by law. It seems to have been 
originally made by Eley and only one member of the board , 
but there was evictence introduced tending to show that the 
contract was afterward ratified by the other members of the 
school board, and also by the entire school district.-----
We think that such a contract might be ratified and made 
binding upon the sc hool district." (5) 
The school house and site is considered public property . The 
land is purchased by public money ani the building is erected by 
the expenditure of public money. A.t all times it is placed under 
the control of t he board of directors of the school district. The 
use of the building for any private purpo se such as tne holding of 
religious meetings, or po~itical meetings, or social gatherings or 
the ike, is not authorized oy law and any t axpey er has the right 
to complain although adequate rent is received f or the use of the 
builo..ing from such organizations. 
In the case of John G. Spencer vs. Joint School District No . 
6, etc., Mr. Spencer complains that the joint building of the 
district is so being used and that in such use , property belonging 
to him, in thew~ of text books, school supplies, etc., is des-
troyed and confiscated, and asks in his petition that the school 
district be enjoined from t he letting of the building for such use. 
The case was tried in the district court and through error appealed 
to the supreme court fot its decision. 
The decision of the court follows, as given by Brewer, J.: 
"-----It seems to us that upon well-settled principles the 
question must be answered in the negative. The public school 
house cannot be used for private use, and purposes . The 
5 . Kansas Reports . Vol. 39, P• 347. 
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argument is a s r1ort one, taxation is levied to raise funds to 
erect the building; but taxation is illegitimate to provide for 
any other purposes. Taxation will not lie to raise funds to 
build a place for a religious society, a political society or 
a social club. ,hat CallD.Ot be done directly cannot be done 
indirectly. As you cannot levy taxes to build a church, no 
more mey you levy tax.es to build a school-house and then lease 
it for a church.----- The use of a public school house for a 
single religious or a political gathering is as uuauthorized 
as its constant use thereafter." (6) 
Following the decision of the court, offered by Judge Brewer 
in the preceding paragrapn, one wonders as t·o the authority of the 
district in levying taxes. This was presented to the court through 
the case of The Marion and McPherson Railwey Company vs. T. P . 
Alexander, as County l reasurer, etc. 
In this case the plaintiff enjoins the collection of taxes 
levied for school purposes in District No . 79 of Marion County, 
Kansas. A graded school had been organized with identical bound-
aries and electors with sc hool district No . 79 and the two were 
operating as a union schooi. The plaintiff contended, that to 
operate, the $Chools were not permitted to levy taxes in excess of 
two percent . The school board claimed that it had the right to 
levy tax in excess of two percent above that as required to 
operate the regular school district. The supreme court presented 
its decision in t he matter through Cunningham, J., as follows : 
6. Kansas Reports. Vol . ~5 , P• 25~ . 
"----The authority to levy taxes is an extraordinary one. 
It is never left to implication , unless it be a necessary 
implication. Its warrant mu.st be clearly found in the act 
of the legislature. ,AJ;J.y other rule might lead to great wrong 
and oppression, and when there is a reasonable doubt as to 
its existance, t he right must be denied . ~herefore, to say 
that the right is in doubt, is to deny its existance.------
0ur conclusion is, that the decision of t he district court 
must be reversed, with direction to make the injunction 
perpetual, restraining all of the defendants from collecting 
that part of the school truces in excess of two percent." 
( 7) 
From this decision of the court, there is no doubt, but that 
the right of the school district to levy truces mu.st be clearly 
found in the statute. 
Statutory provisions are made for the school district to meet 
and make the necessary levy for taxes, mald.nij i .t the duty of the 
clerk to certify the same to t he board of county commissioners, 
upon the receipt __ of. which it becomes its duty to make t he levy and 
have the county clerk place the same upon the tax roll. The dates 
for the annual meetings are set and according to the difference 
in the school organization, at different times, but the periods 
for the reports of the school clerks and the commissioners reports 
are directory . The same is the decision of the court in the case 
of the Rural High School District No. ~3 in U-efferson County vs. 
Kenneth Raub , as County Clerk of Shawnee County . 
In this case , the rural high school district was formed so 
late in the year (August 15) that when the new school board through 
7. Kansas Report s. Vo~. 63, P• 72i • 
its clerk certified the same to the county commissioners, and that 
body made the levy for taxation and asked the county clerk to 
spread the same upon the tax rolls, he refused to do so, placing 
as his reason, tbat the same should have been done on or before 
the first Monday in August and that it was now too late . The 
school board brought action against the clerk of the county to 
force him to write the levy upon the tax roll of the district . 
Porter, J . reports the opinion of the court as: 
"We think, however, that in view of the general princi2les 
upon which the reason for the rule of interpretation referred 
to rests, and the interests of tbe public in a case like the 
present, we are warranted in holding that the provisions in 
respect of time in which the officers shall act are directory 
and not manditory . The statute authorizes the organization 
of a rural high school district by an election, which is the 
duty of the commissioners to call whenever the proper petition 
is presented asking for such an election , and this without 
regard to the time of the year at which the petition is 
presented. --- - Manifestly , the purpose of fixing the time 
in which the various officers shall perform their duties was 
simply to insure an orderly and prompt conduct of official 
business . --- --· We hold therefore, t hat the provision must 
be regarded as directory only, and not manditory." (8) 
Whenever the tax for sc~ool purposes is voted, the same 
reported to the board of county commissioners, and the clerk 
of the county has spread the same upon the tax rolls of that district, 
there is a valid levy . 
A rather unusual case of this kind is recorded in that of 
School District No . 127 of Reno County vs . School District No . 45 
a. Kansas Reports . Vol . 103 , P• 757 . 
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of Reno County . The county superintendent , by regular proceedings 
attached a strip of land to school district No . 45 which had prev-
iously been a pa.rt of school district No . 127 . t the annual school 
meeting , the school district No . 45, with knowledge of the annexation 
voted a tax of twenty-five mills and the school district No. 127 , 
with like knowledge of the loss of the land, voted a tax of thirteen 
mills . Both tax records were in due course, certified to the county 
boa.rd of commissioners, which in turn, asked the clerk of the county 
to spread the same upon the rolls for taxation against the two 
districts. Tb.e clerk of the county, by mistake, overlooked the 
previous change of bourrla.ries, and entered upon the tax rolls, 
thirteen mills voted by scnool district No. 127, upon the pro_perty 
in the trip of land which belonged to school district No . 45, and 
which should have carried twenty-five mill s . Furthermore, in the 
apportionment of the school funds, the school district No. 127 
drew the thirteen mills taxation from this strip which amounted to 
~21 . 13. In the case, school district No . 45 ~ried to collect 
this amount from the school district No . 127. 
The opinion of the supreme court as given by Smith, J. is to 
ti s effect a 
"-----It cannot be ea.id that the county clerk extended on the 
rolls a levy by school district No. 127 against the property 
in the strip of land attached to school district No. 45, as 
there waa no such levy extended . The coU1J.ty clerk, whatever 
was in his mind, simply extended upon the rolls, against the 
property in the strip , a levy less in amount than had been 
legally made by t he school aistrict No . 45 . Neither by his 
action in tnis respect nor the fact that a higher rate should 
have been extended and collected can Qeprive the scnool district 
No . 45 of the money which was lawfully collected for it . The 
mistake of the county clerk, and that of the treasurer, in 
peying the money , wnich belonged to school uistrict No . 45 , 
to school district No . 127 , gave no right to the latter to 
retain the same or to r efuse the demand of school district 
No . 45 therefor . 11 (9 ) 
There is an occassion whereby the county superinteMent ma,y make 
the high school l evy when the commissioners fail to do or refuse 
to do so . The county commissioners place the levy for the county 
high school, and in case they do not, the coU1J.ty superintendent 
of public instruction may do so, which levy cannot be in excess 
of the product of ~1 , 200 times the number of teachers of the high 
scnool . 
This is shown in the case of The Board of Education of the 
City of Pr att vs . Thomas E. Eubank, as County Superintendent, of 
Schools , as an original proceeding for declaratory judgment. 
The county commissioners made a levy of 1 . 148 mills, and the 
county superint endent made a levy of 1.168 mills . Later on 
reconsideration , the county superintendent made and certified a 
second levy of 1 . 35 mills , the legal limit . The first levy of the 
county superintendent was placed on the tax rolls, but the second 
9 . Kansas Reports. Vol . 80 , P• 641 . 
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levy did not reacb. the clerk ill time to be placed upon the rolls . 
The result of which was a shortage in the school funds for the year. 
Burch, J. reports the interpretation of the court in the 
following: 
"-----The amount to be raised is the product of $1200 
multiplied by the number of teachers. It is the duty 
of the county cornmis bioners to make a levy sufficient to 
produce that sum. If the county conmissioners fail to make 
a levy sufficient to produce that sum, the county superinten-
dent shall make a suitable levy, that is, a levy to produce 
that sum. The legislature has determined the needs of the 
schools, the statute is mandatory tbmoughout, and neither 
the county board nor the COUllty superintendent has any 
discretion in the matter·" ( 10) 
In first and second class cities, the statutes axrange for 
a different method of certifying taxes for the sc hools. The 
sc hool board prepares the budget and before it may become effective 
it must have the approval of the city council. But the auestion 
has arisen in some instances as to the meaning of the clause, 
"approval of the qi ty council". Is t his approval mandatory or 
otherwise? In the case of the State of Kansas ex rel., vs. 
William addis , Mayor , et al., this question is settled and the 
relationship between the city council anu the city school board 
established. 
In this particular case, the board of education of the city 
of F.nporia prepared the budget calling for a fifteen mills levy 
ror the year to expend in the operation of the schools, and pre-
10. Kansas Reports . Vol. 121, P• 562. 
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sented the same to the city council of Emporia. In a meeting of the 
council, it was decided not to approve the levy of fifteen mills, 
and offered to approve tne budget at thirteen mills. Upon this 
decision of tne city council, the school board drew a writ of 
mand.amu.s against the city boaru and meyor, trying to enforce the 
acceptance of the budget as requested at fifteen mills. The writ 
was denied by the trial court and appealed to the supreme court 
for its decision. .l!'ollowing is the opinion of the court as given 
by Johnston, J-: 
n----We think the terms employed when given their natural 
and ordinary signification involve an exercise of judgment 
and discretion, and that the approval referred to implies the 
official assent and sanction of the city council. Nothing 
in the consequences of the act or in the difficulties attend-
ing its operation warrant s the court in eliminating one of 
the checks plainly placed by the legislature upon the power 
of imposing a tax..---- It might have lodged the power of 
determining this levy i n ei the:r of the ~A ·bodies, as well as 
in both of the~, and might have required that there be a 
joint concurrence.---- The writ will be denied." (11) 
It is within the power of the rural high-school to levy for 
school _purpose at its annual meeting. This is unusual, in its 
aFplication, in that t his power is not granted the ordinary school 
district board. This is the opinion of the court in the case of 
Otis Laswell et al., vs. G. M. Seaton et al., as the School Board 
of High School District No. 3 of Pottawatomie County. This case is 
of an injUllction served against the board to keep it from building, 
11. Kansas Reports . Vol . 59 , p . 762. 
when it was thought not to have money enough on hands from the 
sale of bonds . The school board h~d figured that with the present 
money on hands, it would be able to start the operation and meet 
the balance needed by taxation. Further details of the case are 
not needed in the discussion; t he statement of the judge concerning 
t l.1e taxing powers of the board is to our interest. 
The opinion of the court as g iven by Porter, J. carries t~ 
f ollowing statement: 
11 In the same section (Section 4 of Chapter 284 of the Laws 
of 1917) it is provided that the annual meeting of the high 
school ooard shall be held on the f ollowing Mon.day , at which 
time t he board is required to make the necessary levy for 
taxes , not to exceed four ·mills on the dollar on the valuation 
of all property in the high school district, to pa,y teachers, 
to $~eate a fund to retire any indebtedness and interest on 
the same , to purchase a site, to _build, hire or purchase a 
school house a.n11 to pc33 incidental exgenses of the high 
school . It is at the annual meeting of Ghe high school board 
that it determines how the school shall be conducted and 
makes the tax levy . " (1 2) 
The school district is bound ·by the contract of i t s board 
members for r epairs . It is the duty of the board and a part of its 
obligat i ons t o its district to see that t he building is kept in 
constant repair . It is granted that because of the different 
element s , the building is bound to decay and be in constant need 
of repair . I t is within the vo i ce of the electors that certain 
specific r epair s be done , and that the budget be enlarged to meet 
12. Kansas Reports. Vol . 107, P• 439 . 
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the expenditures necessary for the same. But even at that with 
sucb. a budget depleted , the board finds itself obligated to do 
other needed repairs. 
Such is shown in the case of c. F, Conklin vs, School District 
No. 37 , etc. Mr, Conklin with help , placed a glass in the school 
hou~e door and did some painting of the walls of tbe building, 
after which, he billed the school board for ~5 . uO . The ooard 
refused top~ the bill stating that tne budget for repairs, as 
arranged by the electors at the annual meeting was completely 
depleted , The case was appealed, through error to the supreme 
court. The decision of that court, as given by Brewer , J. is: 
•tThe district board shall have the care and keeping of t he 
school house and other property belonging to the district, 
which authorizes and requires that the board preserve and 
care for the school house." (13) 
It sometimes happens tbat because of necessity and conven-
ience, one or the other members of the school board will sign an 
order for the purchase of school supplies, without the knowledge and 
sanction of the other members of the boara. Taen the question will 
arise as to the legality of such an action, and by what , if acy , 
authority such action was executed. Sometirres school boards have 
acti.og committies , with authority ~elegated to them to act if it 
is within their judgment to do so, 
13 , Kansas Reports . Vol, 22 , P• 521. 
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In the case of the Union School ~urniture Compaey vs . School 
District No . 60 of Elk County , it is shown that a member of the 
school board signed a.n order for f'urni ture and some other school 
supplies, without the sanction of the complete board, and that, 
because he had in his possession signed warrants, filled one out 
for the purchases invoice and delivered tt to the agent. The 
merchandise, being delivered, was immediately put into service. 
The furniture c ompa.Dy presented the warrant for acceptance and 
payment , but was unable to get the school board to make payment 
upon it. The contract ran along for a peri od of five years and the 
furniture company placed the contract within the hands of the court 
for collection. The defendant board was able to defeat the case in 
t he trial court, so the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court, 
in error, for satisfaction within its contrnct. 
The opinion of the court as delivered by Allen, J. follows: 
11 - - ---It is found oy the court, and all evidence in the case 
shows, that t he defendant school district received the school 
fu.rni ture----and has held and used t be same----over a period 
of nearly five and one-half years . we are utterly at a loss 
to understand how tile defendant, having kept and used tbe 
furnitur e during all this time can claim to be excused from 
making any _payment therefor . It uay be conceded that both 
the written instruments were void, and that no action could 
be maintained on either or botn of them; yet the defendant 
district , having rece i ved and retained the property------
is bound in common honesty to pay for it." (14) 
14. Kansas liepor t s. Vol . 50 , p . 727 . 
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Ordinarily, when a school board assumes its duties, that 
body is considered as a board of directors of the school district . 
Those duties are numerable and variable . The state statute tries 
to enumerate those duties, but even then we find them questioned . 
Occassions arise whereby the board is left in a quandry as to its 
scope of authority . Into just which particular division of the 
budget may this contract be placed , and if placed there, has the 
board the authority to make such a contract? 
In the case of N. J . swayze vs. school District No . 17, 
Chase county, the question arose as to the authority of t he school 
board in purchasing a mathematical chart as necessary appendages 
or apparatus . 
The syllabus of the court shows that the school board contracted 
for the chart and issued a warrant for the purchase price. The 
warrant, being negotiable, was delivered to .. r. N. J . swayze, 
who presented it and demanded payment . Upon the refusal of the 
treasurer to honor the warrant, M.X' . swayze placed the same with 
the court, asking for satisfaction. The decision of the trial 
court was in his favor , because of which, the school board appealed. 
The opinion of the court as delivered by valentine , J . is: 
"-----Now it is certain that all kinds of school apparatus 
are not included among the artic l es properly denominated 
11 appendages 11 ; but we think it is equally certain that some 
kinds of school apparatus may be denoted "appendages''"; 
for instance, we would think that blackboards, outline maps 
and mathematical chart s , hung upon walls of the school house and 
to remain there permanently f or t he purpose of illustrating 
such l essons in science, history or geography as might be 
taught in the schools, might properly be denominated both 
"school apparatus and ' appendages"' . A mathematical chart 
might be hung upon the wal 1 s _of a school house and become 
an appendage; and it might al s o be used for the pur pose of 
illustrating the science of mathematics and thereby become 
a part of t he apparatus used by the school.-----The evidence 
in controversy , outside of the order itself , tends to 
show t hat t he apparatus for which it was given was a 
. mathematical chart. It is possible, and even probable , that 
this chart was in fact worthless; but as there was no evidence 
that it was worthless, it must be p resumed that it had value , 
and that it was worth the amount wb.ic the sc hoo l board 
agreed to pay for it.-----We cannot say t hat aey material 
error was committed by the court below, and therefore , its 
judgment must be affirmed." (15) 
15 . Kansas Reports . Vol . 29 , P• 211 . 
CONCLUSION 
The operation of school district s , outsi de of cit i e s of the 
first and second clas s is controlled by t he coUll.ty super intendent 
of pu blic instruction. 
The provision for school district meetings called upon 
peti tion of resident tax payers is held to be pe rmissive rather 
ttian mandatory . 
Whenever a sc hool board is petitioned to meet, i t is the duty 
of t he clerk of the board to post notices calling t b.e meeting. 
Because of tb.e corporate powers given t b.e school district , 
it becomes the duty of tb.e d irector of t he boar d to a ssume control 
of litigation. 
contract being made by one member of the school board 
is void. However, it m~ become valid when, and i f , rati f ied by 
t he whole board. 
If a.DY tax: payer has a legal rig ht of dissension, t he school 
building cannot be used for social gatherings, political gat herings 
or private use although adequate rent is paid. 
The right of the district to levy taxes must be clearly 
found in the statutes. 
OU 
The statute concerning the levy of taxes by the school board 
is directory; the county commissioners having the right to adjust, 
and a taxpayer having the right to contest the same. 
'Where the tax voted at a regular schooa meeting becomes 
certified by the county clerk, there is a valid tax. 
It is the duty of tbe county superintendent of publ ic 
instruction to make a gigh school levy when the commissioners of 
the county fail or refuse to do so. 
The school board tax levy in cities of the second class must 
have the intelligent approval of tbe city council. 
The rural high school board has the power to levy tax.es for 
school purposes at the annual meeting. 
The school board is bound by its contract for repairs. 
The retention and use of school furniture bought without 
authority ratifies the contract of purchase. 
The school board has the authority to purchase a mathematical 




The Supreme Court, as chief interpreter of the laws of tb.e State , 
in relation to the schools, holds closely to tb.e constitution, and 
to state rights. Also, that scb.ools mu.st be pv.rely democratic . 
This generalization is clearly shown in the decision of the court 
in the case of the City of Pratt vs. Thomas E. Eu.bank , as County 
Superintendent , (p. 73), and in the case of Olin G. Cline et al., 
vs. w. G. Wettstein et al., (p. 17-18). 
In the case of the City of Pratt vs. Thomas E. Eubank as 
County Superintendent, cited in the previouR paragraph, it may 
further be observed that provision for free schools is mandatory, 
a.nd the obligation for this provision, is a responsibility of 
the citizen, as taxpayer, and an elector of the state. 
In the interpretation of a specific law, the Supreme Court 
tends to seek the will of the people of a district, rather than 
to follow strictly the reading of the law . This is clear in the 
case of Rural High School District No. 101 of Jefferson County, 
ex rel., Bert Metzger, as Director, etc., vs. w. E. Davis , as 
State Auditor, etc., (p. 49). 
The court , rather closely holus, that school organizations 
are quasi-corporat ions acting as agencies for the State. In this 
way it is able to clearly distinguish between quasi-corporations 
and paying corporations. Citation is made to a number of cases in 
the thesis, (5, 6, 7, 22). 
The.Supreme Court looks upon commercial contracts of a school 
board in the same light as any contract drawn in commercial activi-
ties; frequently presenting e~oss-citations of decisions made , 
regarding contracts of regular commercial enterprises, to explain 
its decision in a particular case. This is shown in the case of 
H. c. Hensley and o. c. Brosus as Partners etc., vs. School 
District No. 87 of Anderson County, etc. , (p.36- 37), the case of 
u. F. Conklin vs . School District No. 37, etc . , (p. 76), and the 
case of N. J . Swayze vs . School District No . 17 of Chase County, 
{p. 78- 79) . 
In the interpretation of the court, regarding laws affecting 
the organizing of schools, one finds a rather liberal attitude. 
It all ows for continued economic and social growt~ , realizing that 
our society is dynamic and. that the organization of schools and 
the interpretation of the school laws rrru.st necessarily be made to 
fit such a society . These facts may easily be seen in its attitude 
concerning the consolidation of school districts, the re-organizing 
of school districts and attaching parts of a district to first and 
second class city districts , and in its review of the "Cash Basis Law". 
Ou 
Never once, in the practices of the court has it refused to 
listen to a damaged taxpayer of a school district. In the case 
of John G. Spencer vs. the Joint District No . 6, etc ., Mr. 
Spencer became damaged by the activities permitted within the 
building. It seemed that the activities were sanctioned by the 
majority of the electors of the district, and that possibly Mr. 
Spencer was alone in the case , (p. 67- 68). 
However, the court has reprimanded the scnool board or a 
single member of the board for not having faithfully met the 
trust placed upon him by the electors of the school district , as 
s~own in the case of R. D • .Armstrong as County Attorney of Scott 
County vs. W. D. Luke , as ~lerk of School District No . 2 of 
Scott County, (p. 64-65). 
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